REPORTS ▫ 9

ORGANIZED INTEREST GROUPS AND THE URBAN POLICY PROCESS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Interest groups have tended to exert a major influence during the past two decades and particularly in urban contexts. From the political and ideological standpoints, the advocacy role played by interest groups and its impact on public policy have received the attention of the media. However, the symbiotic role which interest groups play in moulding urban policy still remains largely unexplored.

In theory interest groups play an essential role in democratic political systems of urban government, providing an outlet through which the citizen may participate to some degree in the shaping of urban policy. These groups help mobilize public opinion, and provide organizational and ideological support for citizen needs and preferences. Interest groups do provide critical inputs into the urban community decision-making system. Despite these contributions, interest groups are often considered as both normatively and operationally marginal. Regardless of variations in political structure and culture, group legitimacy and the intensity of lobbying, interest groups play a critical linkage role, bringing together the private and public sectors.

The political behaviour of interest groups at the urban government level often include direct or indirect attempts to influence governmental elites and their decisions. Canada inherited from Britain an organic, corporatist social philosophy in which the role of private groups is considered equally legitimate as that of government and equally necessary for policy making which would be in the public interest. Furthermore,

collective corporation refers to a conception of society in which government freely delegates many of its functions, and much of its largesse, to private groups which enjoy both normative and functional legitimacy in the political system.

Underlying this study is a very basic assumption that organized interest groups are important actors in the urban policy process. Organized interest groups are more likely to have a leadership structure, and communication occurs between group leaders and city council. Such groups try to influence the urban decision-making system because they perceive a stake - a public policy outcome. That stake can be something the interest group wants to gain or protect. Different kinds of resources are used by interest groups to influence public policy.

The urban political arena is filled with numerous groups with different memberships, interests, and political ideologies and strategies. Not all groups actively seek to influence urban policies in order to maximize benefits and preserve their group interests. The purpose of this study is to examine the dynamics of interest groups in urban life. We have tried to examine the following dimensions of interest groups: the legitimacy of interest groups, the issues that concern them, the resources they possess and the tactics they use in attempting to influence urban government policy, patterns of communication, political structure and culture in which they operate, and the nature and extent of interest groups' influence on urban policy.

The study of urban policy process presents an important need to review the relationship of civic government to the group actors within its jurisdiction. Mediation of aggregate interests through group

structures is not a new phenomenon, yet our changing urban social relationships have, in more recent times, been subject to an expansion of the breadth of interest areas beyond the traditional business and ratepayers issues and into the social service field. While the social service field has burgeoned over the past decade thus initiating intrusions into the exclusiveness of long-standing civic jurisdictions, other interests are undergoing growth as well. In recent years, a new wave of interest groups have been calling upon civic authorities for a share of the policy decision-making process.

One may understand group interests as part of private sector organized citizen participation involving the active attempt to alter policy directions, yet the mediators of aggregated interests are not exclusively based on this type of approach. It is difficult to ascribe "private" to the understanding of political parties and school boards; attempts to influence decisions on urban policy may be described as peripheral to the activities of social need groups or the elderly; and the long-standing separation of the citizenry from the governing executive diminishes with the increase of a wider spectrum of legitimized interest orientations which depends upon cooperation, not competition, with government and a favourable will and commitment on the part of elected representatives. The study of politics at the urban level can no longer be content with the rudiments of interest group dynamics based on traditional groups or conflict.

This study attempts to identify traditional and emerging relationships between areas of citizen interest and local government in the City of

Winnipeg. It is hoped that a better understanding of the diversity and complexity of groups and their needs will lead towards altered civic rationale and, therefore, new local government responsibilities designed to better serve a greater proportion of all interests. The following review of research and theory is intended to set the stage for analyses of interest groups in Winnipeg.

II. RESEARCH AND THEORY

A review of relevant literature reveals some limitations of research on interest groups. First, the diversity of group interests necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. However, most studies on interest groups focus upon political aspects. While the relationship between business and government, an understanding of socio-economic variables, activities of political parties, and the dynamics of groups of protest are researched by political scientists, other interest groups and issues that require an interdisciplinary approach are few. Philanthropy, for example, is discussed largely from a moral perspective which is quite remote to the relation of the city to the group. School boards, as another example, are not considered within the context of civic government as they constitute a level of government in themselves. In short, studies on the relationship of some interest groups to government are unavailable.

Second, much of the research originates in the United States and is, therefore, specific to that culture. There is overlap with the Canadian experience, yet one must be wary of the heavy emphasis placed upon the pluralist conflict model[1] of interest articulation and the increased role of private sector and decreased role of public sector sponsorship of social agencies. Further, the overt competitive and individualist values of Americanism tend to be a roadblock to increased government leadership in non-traditional areas of interest. The American perspective emphasizes government responsiveness to interests rather than active cooperative

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[1] This same view is also expressed in Pross (1975, p. 18). The context for Pross is the "Canadian System."

involvement or leadership. A comparative analysis of group cultural differences would indeed be a worthy venture, yet, for the purpose of this research the American model of group activity cannot be adequately applied to Canada.

Third, the research on certain aspects of interest groups pertains to the senior level of government and not the local government. This is not to say that activities are unrelated, but rather that the issue of local government has not been a subject of interest. The problem is reflected in the relative paucity of research on interest groups in urban communities.

Fourth, many studies provide perspectives on traditional relationships, the business sector in particular, and more recent developments such as resident reaction to the neighbourhood invasion of the development industry in the past decade. Missing, however, is contemporary information on these types of interests which are non-confrontational, social-service oriented, or not directly related to local government---the school board, for example. Furthermore, most studies seem to have less relevance to contemporary urban milieu.

Fifth, while political value systems, ie., ideologies, are not generally as apparent at the local level as they are at senior government levels, the literature on civic politics is reflective of such distinctions. Political ideologies broady categorized as "Right," "Centre" and "Left" are represented. On the Right, Heinz Eulau (1973) avoids discussion of influence resulting from protest action and pays almost no attention to the role of business interests or those entities which are not accommodated by the political system yet who make demands upon it. There is

an implicit assumption that political process is vested in the trust given to officials whose authority is legitimate; and it appears that groups that deviate from subordination to the authority trust of the elected are insufficiently legitimized to have a place in the study.

Most studies, however, are more reflective of a liberal tradition (Lineberry and Sharkansky, Pross, McGahan, Zisk, Cole, Kaplan, Clark). These studies, unlike Eulau's study, address the role of economic power i.e. business and assess citizen protest as a legitimate exercise, and make distinctions between socio-economic power groupings. Finally, a more recent addition to the literature comes from the "Left" (Pickvance, Gutstein, Lorimer, Aubin, Gerecke, Sewell, Tabb and Sawers, Castells, Harloe, Roussopoulus). The attention here shifts from dry analyses of the systems and structures of political frameworks and profiles of salient actors towards the dynamics of subjective will operating in social perspective. The polity is not assessed in sterile research environments where one variable is controlled while measuring another. The statistical descriptions are assumed and used as tools to bring into question the tensions between entities relative to the urban polity.

Can ideologically-based subjective interpretation be avoided? The answer to this dilemma is, of course, subject to interpretation. As such, the real question is not how to avoid subjectivity, but rather how to deal with it. A single theoretical model has not been followed in this analysis. Instead, attempts have been made to selectively employ, whenever

relevent and meaningful, different theoretical-ideological models without being overly concerned with rigorous purity.

Theory as reflected in the literature follows two major orientations. As previously mentioned, there was a grouping of liberal social science writers and a grouping of socialist writers. In regard to the urban interest group culture, both branches of thought projected their ideas in identifiable eras until the late 1970s. Since that time, however, development of theories of interest group politics has stagnated. It is necessary, then, to acknowledge the resulting vacuum and to review the established analytical base.

Pross (1975) considers an interest group in the national context and states that, "pressure groups are organizations whose members act together to influence policy in order to promote their common interest."[2] There is continuity with the American model; the assumptions of activity rests on competitive circumstances; and the group acts consciously to have an effect on government.

Some assumptions are implicit to this concept. First, Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) and Eulau (1973) make references to the stakes at city hall, but almost exclusively in light of business interests[3], that is, interests which focus on economic growth of the city and lower taxes.[4] The implication is that the money invested or expected by business enterprise gives them a stake in policy far above other interests.

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[2] Pross, page 2.

[3] Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 95; Eulau, page 330.

[4] Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 104.

Without a stake in policy direction, it is not expected that a group would need to concern itself with city government.

Second, the group is sufficiently endowed as to be capable of funding its own efforts. The issue of the funding of interest groups originating from government sources has not received much attention by researchers. A study undertaken for the Canadian Council on Social Development by Novia Carter, (1974) is an exception. Third, it is assumed that the demands of the group making appeals to policy decisions are in fact eligible for accommodation. As accommodation is determined by councillors attitudes on what is or is not legitimate, it should not be expected that all demands are acted upon. This assumption cannot account for the absence of groups which have been frustrated to the point of giving up, and therefore, are absent from the list of major group actors.

A recent study of councillors' attitudes to interest groups provided evidence to show an hierarchy of favour. A survey (Chekki, 1983) of the senior councillors and mayors in cities in Western Canada showed that the groups most favoured were the elderly and business. the groups least favoured were low income and minority groups, and, within the mid-range, neighbourhood associations, unions and homeowners fared better than ratepayers associations, the media, churches, or civic groups. Political parties were not mentioned by any respondent.

Influence was seen as somewhat different. The groups most significant in influencing city council was business with neighbourhood associations, and unions clustered for a distant second. Most other groups had influence

ratings closer to the bottom of the scale with the very bottom being shared by the church and elderly as well as minority and low-income groups. The most salient feature was the consistently high ratings for business and low ratings for minorities and the poor.

Similar findings are reported in studies by Zisk (1983). While business is again substantially higher than any other group in terms of influence, low-income groups are not mentioned and seniors are rated low.[5]

Constructing a profile of favoured and unfavoured interest groups from the research should provide a theoretical basis for understanding interest group success. Ample data regarding group characteristics of business has been collected. There is, however, an acute paucity of profiles of any other major groups' interest area.

Business follows the C. Wright Mills notion that control of institutions of power is equated with influence.[6] In practice, in statistical breakdowns of the city councils of Winnipeg, Toronto, and Vancouver, James Lorimer shows that half or more of the councillors were allied with the property industry and asserts that it would be rare to find a council with fewer than one-third having this stripe.[7] A similar observation is made by Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) who also add that office holders are recruited from the ranks of business and the professions thus substantiating the claim that business commands formidable political resources.[8] In terms of interaction with government elites, the

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5 Zisk, page 23.
6 Zeigler, page 89.
7 Lorimer, page 96.
8 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 105.

directors of business groups rank substantially higher than other groups.[9] Business group directors are also substantially better paid than directors of other groups, yet, on the basis of occupation and educational status, the SES index for business directors is not the highest overall.[10] In short, the findings of the numerous analyses show that business people are well established and legitimized as participants in the political process and have easy access to civic government.

The antithesis to the profile of the business groups (or the best documented group that has achieved success), then, would produce a profile of a group having little access to government officials, little interaction, and little representation on council. The group in question would be poorly educated with low status occupations and low income. Verba and Nie (1972) indicate that such attributes are consistent with political inactivity. As minority groups and low-income groups are at the bottom of the list of influential actors (Chekki, 1983), one might add the attributes of minority group status and poverty to the profile.

As groups are at best influential and not the actual decision-makers, the character and attitudes of the councillors are a factor in relationships. A study by Joyce and Hosse (Toronto, 1970) describes the average councillor as being "conservative, Protestant, affiliated with a business group, about fifty years old, married with two children, owns his own house, has lived in the community for at least

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[9] Presthus, page 127.
[10] Presthus, page 125.

fifteen years, and is employed in a professional or managerial position."[11] Underrepresented, then, are women, low-income people, non-property owners, working class, less educated people, non-business, single and unmarried persons, and so on.[12]

It would be a mistake to value the evidence in either positive or negative lights. It would also be a mistake to assume that the reason for such generally recognized inequity between rich and poor is the result of some coordinated will. Residual, however, is the fact that evidence in the literature overwhelmingly supports the view that political power is vested in elites and privileged sectors of society.

Will the data for the Winnipeg case support a theory that the business sector occupies a position of privilege encouraged by council? Are groups outside of the business sector ignored? Which group's attributes correlate with council favour or disfavour?

The research on interest groups makes passing references to modes of communication used by group actors in the process of contact with officials. Two hypotheses seem to emerge. First, there is a positive correlation between a favourable group relationship with civic officials and intimate

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11 As quoted in McGahan, page 308.

12 As a footnote to this conclusion, Eulau writes about 7 areas of group representation - namely 1. main street business interest, 2. a quasi-government sector, 3. public interest conservation, 4. large landowners and upper class economic elites, 5. industrial and manufacturing interest, 6. taxpayer and homeowner groups, and 7. recreation and education sectors. Missing from his study are the lower-income and minority groups which rated low in influence (Chekki, 1983). See Eulau, page 367.

modes of communication. Support for this hypothesis was found in the studies by Verba and Nie, Eulau, Prethus, Lorimer, Sewell and Gutstein. Second and conversely, groups that resorted to protest, for whatever reasons, positively correlate with disfavour. Paul Schumaker's study (1975) is salient in this area. As a complimentary hypothesis it would be desirable to explore the correlation between groups using lobby activities and their use of protest or intimate contact: the frequency of use of lobby forums is lower among groups who also resort to protest.

In summary, a review of the literature permits understanding of some of the theoretical directions to be investigated in this study. The prominence of business interests is salient as is the marginal consideration of lower-class interests which are most often not mentioned. There is a lack of research on interest groups that fell outside of the traditional scope of civic jurisdictions. Does the Winnipeg case share similar features?

Within the literature, and especially the American sources, there is a dominant perception that interest groups are involved in a competitive self-regarding environment. Groups use their available resources to influence decisions in their favour and either win or lose in relation to other similar groups. Government is perceived as having a place elevated and divorced from the policy and is charged with sorting out who gets what among competing forces. Such a perception is narrow and omits both the situation where a group pursues initiatives which are of no consequence to other groups and the situation in which group interest demands a sense of cooperation between the group and government or

other groups. The reader should note that different interests have greater compatibility with cooperation or laissez-faire than they do with competition.

III. METHODS OF RESEARCH: SAMPLE

The research data on the relationship of the civic government to its constituent group interests were obtained by using an interview guide (see, Appendix (i)) through in-person interviews. Reports issued by some of the groups, presentations made by group representatives, and statistical data were useful. Each interview (which followed a similar format) lasted one hour on average and was conducted by the same interviewer using the same interview guide. In each of the 16 interviews, the interviewee was the representative spokesperson of the group and held an official position on the group's executive. Interviews were conducted in the month of July 1983, with the exception of one further interview which was conducted in April 1984. Using similar format, the later interview was conducted to expand interest orientations to include an important sector not present in the initial round — the elderly.

The definition of "interest group" differs from the perception of a group whose members hold a certain viewpoint or have a particular need which is brought forward to government in lobby fashion. Such a group would be a competitor[13] for government resources among similar competitors all attempting to apply pressure to effect policy direction. This definition is rather narrow in its scope. It tends to exclude many groups that attempt to influence urban policy. For the purpose of this study an organized interest group refers to a formally recognizable citizen

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[13] In Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, Robert Presthus does not explicitly include competitiveness in his list of resources used by

organization, with or without either formal membership or constituency, whose activity has some element of societal involvement which is or could be identifiable with the urban community environment.

The universe of interest groups that would fall within this definition could be identified through a compilation of organized interest groups in Winnipeg. Because groups are continually being formed or disbanded and are often obscure and out of view, description of an absolute population is not possible. To derive a sample, the questionnaire (see Appendix (ii)) issued to mayors as a part of a major study on urban policy provided a general guide to salient interest areas. The groups interviewed were thought to best represent the relevant areas. In certain instances where more than one perspective was necessary, additional groups within the same interest orientation were chosen for interviews. As a result this study reviews eight interest areas encompassing sixteen interest groups.

The areas of interest reviewed include: philanthropy, unionism, social only need, business, the elderly, political parties, and the school board. While business is adequately represented by interviews, the property-development- industry side of business was difficult to access and sensitive to criticism. It could be argued that the media should be included, but the media does not ascribe to this study's definition of interest groups as it is not a formally recognizable citizen organization; the media belongs to the corporate sector. Churches were only rarely active in urban politics and were, therefore, left out of the sample. The

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group directors. He says "resources of directors include five types: commitment, political efficacy, persuasiveness, legitimacy, and what may be called 'the cooperative ethic!" page 122.

interests represented provide a broad sample of major group actors who function in the City of Winnipeg, but not all major actors. This study attempts to present some salient aspects of these perspectives in the context of prior research and the proposed theoretical orientation.

IV. INTEREST GROUPS IN WINNIPEG

In this study, data from the interviews were used to assess several variables in terms of their universality across the sample. Some of these variables and attributes lend themselves to an aggregation within distinguishable areas of analysis. The areas of analysis include the pattern of city council's extent of favour or disfavour towards interest groups, including funding patterns and communication patterns. The data presented in tables represent universal variables. Some aspects of the city-group relationship, however, are unique and specific to certain groups only. In the latter category, two cases will be presented.

A. REVENUE SOURCES

The power of interest groups tends to be correlated to the group's financial base. Most interest groups, however, are largely on their own to raise operational revenues. The question of interest group funding is inadequately documented to provide a firm basis for theoretical understanding. No clear model emerges by which the relevance of funding sources may be adequately treated.

Two significant epochs have occurred in the Winnipeg situation as a result of changed group income sources and have transformed the traditional standings of quite a diversity of interests. The first epoch was initiated by the NDP provincial administration of Edward Schreyer in the early 1970s. The NDP government's approach is reported to have been "vastly more open (in) communication between provincial and governmental departments and citizen self-help groups."[14] Funding of 32 social service agencies in Winnipeg in 1969 amounted to $2,613,554, but, in 1970, which marks the NDP's

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[14] Carter, page 73, 74.

first full year in office, funding doubled to a level of $5,464,957.[15] With the changes came a new role for government in its relationship with service agencies.

A better understanding of the thoughts behind this new pattern of activity may be found in the following quotation from a report of Winnipeg's Community Welfare Planning Council (1971) regarding the role of the United Way and that agency's determination of service agency allocations: "the corresponding goals have been related primarily to United Way objectives, and not enough attention has been spent examining the nature of persistent unmet needs, or analyzing the extent to which social policies tend to support these needs."[16] Essential to this epoch is recognition of the extensive resources of government and the evolution of the recognition of selected services as being within public responsiblity.[17] That is, once the service has been deemed necessary to the community, government as the distributor of public good has a role in assuming responsibilities for funding service agencies. As a consequence, growth in the number of agencies funded by government and the United Way, for example, increased to 57 in 1982 (United Way Annual Report, 1982).

The second epoch began in 1980 with the formation of the Core-Area Initiatives (CAI) Fund. Leaders of the three levels of government agreed to contribute $33 million each to a fund whose purpose was directed towards downtown revitalization. Activities included support for social service

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15 Carter, page 196.
16 as quoted in Carter, page 211.
17 Carter, page 53.

agencies and also support for programs of training and employment, housing, community facilities, community services, small business assistance, and historic area development. All three governments have actively involved themselves in roles that are expanded in an unprecedented way. Without digressing into the details of funding which are available in the CAI "Status Report," February 1984, a host of social services agencies and businesses, as well as individual citizens receive funds. For the citizen group, the CAI fund can be used to sustain its activities or create new ones. The result has been that group interest activity has mushroomed creating an identifiable strata of social agencies that would not be able to function in the absence of this new funding source.

TABLE 1

FUNDING SOURCES OF INTEREST GROUPS

INTEREST GROUPS / FUNDING SOURCES	Philanthropic Group	Municipal Unions	Business	Social Service Agencies	Political Parties	Winnipeg School Board	Research Institutes	Neighbourhood Development Corporations	Seniors
City Government	NA	NA	SS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	PS
Government (Non-City)/ CAI	SS	NA	NA	PS	NA	PS	SS	PS	PS
Member Dues	NA	PS	PS	NA	SS	NA	NA	NA	NA
Profit Ventures	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	PS	PS	SS
Private Contributions	PS	NA	NA	NA	PS	NA	PS	NA	NA

*NA = Not Applicable

SS = Secondary Funding Source

PS = Primary Funding Source

Table 1 on funding sources was constructed using the range of sources mentioned in the interviews. There was only one group——the unions——which was solely self funded. Private contributions such as foundation grants or donations from individuals were available to the philanthropic group, political parties, and one research group. Both the research groups and the neighbourhood development corporation depended upon profit generating projects as a primary funding source. In the former case, contract research was carried out; in the latter case, the

group was involved in construction projects, rental of commercial space, and administration of programs for a fee. The Senior's group ran a travel agency as a private group-enterprise, yet the revenue obtained was a secondary income source. Member dues, which were the only funding source for unions, was the most important primary source for business. Political Parties also received member dues, yet the amount of revenue was reflective of a secondary source. Dependency upon member dues was possible in the cases of labour and business because of the commitment of members through legal arrangements and favourable disposition to the high level of importance of the group's activity. In other groups, however, fees of any substance would have served to deter membership.

Non-city government sources of funding were relevant to the philanthropic group, the social services agencies, the neighbourhood development corporation, and seniors. The money received by the philanthropic group came from provincial government lottery revenues. As it is ultimately part of provincial jurisdiction, the change in the role of government has to date extended to supplementing a philanthropic group which has a long tradition of private sector giving. The amount in question was approximately 18% of the philanthropic group's 1982 budget according to the Annual Report. This marks a significant alteration in the complexion of philanthropic giving.

The only groups in this study sample to receive funds from the city were the elderly and business. Such a finding correlates strongly with mayor's and councillor's responses (Chekki, 1983) which placed the elderly and business ahead of any other private sector entity in terms of

"favourable responses" to groups. In the case of the senior's group, the city government contributed $98,000 in 1982 and $104,000 in 1983, this represents approximately 13.2% of total group revenue and a signifcant contribution by any standard. (Annual Report). The more prestigious of the two business groups received funds from the city to finance a business development corporation whose mandate was one of "providing assistance and advice to expanding local businesses and to new businesses considering locating in Winnipeg."[18] The exact amount of funding involved was not available, yet in the interview, it was indicated that the group provided a staff of nine and the city provided funds.

An interesting aspect of the development corporation was that it was billed as an initiative of both the group and the city. What is demonstrated in this perception is the intimacy between the two. Whereas other groups' projects are at times staffed by the group and funded by the government, they would hardly stem from joint initiatives. While staff are group personnel, it should not be assumed that policy would be formulated in isolation from the city. Rather, one would expect the intimacy to extend to a cooperative-consultative process between the project staff and the city.

The fact that the city provides funds to the elderly and business, but no other group, reinforces the findings of a previous study (Chekki, 1983) and reflects the literature showing that council favours these two groups. The privileged position of business in relation to civic decision-makers is in evidence on this basis. The practices of the City of

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[18] "The Chamber", page 8 in "Mid Canada Commerce," June 1983.

Winnipeg are consistent with the traditional roles of city governments and are unreflective of more recent trends in provincial and federal involvement in group funding. Participation in the tri-level government venture provides a different direction, yet a better assessment of attitudes is required before straying from the conclusion that traditional relationships dominate at the local government level in Winnipeg.

B. PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION

The second major variable that significantly contributed to the understanding of city-group relations was communication. Through an inventory of the modes of communication and their accompanying implications, one is able to obtain a more in-depth assessment of who has access to channels of influence and who is shunned and alienated. Several variations are present regarding the proximity of a group to these linkages, and so, by differentiation of communication techniques, measures of the intimacy of communication between the city and groups are made possible.

The range of communication modes extended from the friendly call to the mayor's office to frustrating and fruitless protest demonstrations. Quite expectedly, those who were prone to using protest action did not have access to the mayor through the friendly phone call. In these two opposing instances, there is a clear attempt to communicate group concerns to affect civic policy. The implicit assumption is that the greater the stake in civic policy, the greater the motive to communicate concerns. The strength of a motivating force would have proportional consequences on the willingness of a group to express its concerns. For this reason, the

following discussion assesses stakes as they apply to each group in the sample.

(i) Stakes as a Factor in Motivation.

The interview was inadequate as a vehicle for assessing a group's stake in civic policy because it was inherently difficult to achieve a ranking of the importance of interests according to group leaders' attitudes. Whereas the philanthropic group had minor concerns with city policy, for example, unions had serious concerns in the areas of wages and working conditions. Both group leaders, however, saw their relationship with the city as being very important. By what criteria may stakes be determined? Reference regarding stakes is made in Eulau (1973) and Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) indicating high stakes for business and taxpayer's groups. It should be noted that the perception of high or low stakes is based upon the assumption that there will be policy outputs and that such outputs will affect the group. The underlying assumption is that city policies affect the group's financial interest. The question arises: should financial variables serve as criteria for stakes in every case? The criteria relevant to the school board, for example, would be better understood as quality of education and the criteria for social need groups would be quality of service affecting constituent well-being. For seniors, the stake in city policy might well involve peaceful neighbourhoods and efficient transit services. Where city policy has an impact, the group would have a stake. The record of viewing group civic stakes in terms of financial advantage is ideally suited to business goals, yet there was no

other interest-area in this study that placed profit as being central to its raison d'etre.

As indicated, the base assumption is that potential for policy output which would affect the group exists and that output potential precedes a group's stake. There is, however, no guarantee that policy output will occur to satisfy group needs. If, for example, the attitudes of councillors are unsympathetic to the problems of the unemployed or city native (Canadian Indians and Métis) people, it is possible that those concerns are not perceived to be sufficiently legitimate to warrant attention through policy-making. Such "illegitimate" concerns would be left out of civic affairs. The subsequent alternatives would include the mustering of sufficient protest action which would create an intolerable situation, and thereby force relevant policy.

By what rationale are some groups viewed as legitimate and others illegitimate? If there is an absence of supporting rationale considered to be credible by a majority of councillors, the subjected group is not perceived as having legitimate claims to city resources by incumbents who may then avoid whole sets of interest oriented policies. If policy output or the hope of its occurrence is realized not to be forthcoming, the group either protests and is labelled radical and undesirable or it abandons efforts to bring its concerns to council. Group concerns may become dormant through frustration or passive resignation, yet there is no basis to assert that interest concerns evaporate. An adequate assessment of group stakes requires attention to both a traditional perspective on what constitutes high or low stakes and a view derived from the group's own perspective.

The place of the philanthropic group was explicitly stated as being within the private sector. Accompanying this view was the thought that this approach was "the best defence of the free enterprise system."[19] The desire to remain aloof from government aid has not been completely successful as noted earlier, yet the will to do so remains, and so, the philanthropic group has low stakes in civic government policy.

Another interest area that seems to have low stakes was social need. With all three social need groups in the sample, there was an insignificant amount of funding coming from the city (under $3,000). In the first case, ie., the neighbourhood health clinics, there was no contact with the city on policy and past attempts to pursue funding of significance had run up against insurmountable administrative barriers. In the second case, ie., the native organization, attempts to influence city policy or to solicit help from the city administration had been abandoned for quite some time. The third group, ie., the community education group, was a newer organization, and their more recent attempts to influence city policy had taken the form of overt protest. The lack of funding and policy dialogue between the city and the social need groups did not result from any group-goals of autonomy from government, rather, in all three groups, senior governments played a major role. At the city level, concerns of the social need groups were not translated into policy and efforts to do so were often frustrated. The momentum needed to effect

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[19] Carter, page 88.

protests was insufficient, and so, groups in the social need area perceive the futility and discontinue efforts to influence urban policy.

Presently, frustration has complicated the situation and therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude that stakes are either high or low. On the one hand contact with other governments imply high stakes. On the other hand, the political reality of unsuccessfulness regarding city policies means little contact with the city, but not necessarily low stakes. In a traditional sense, social need is considered to be peripheral to civic jurisdiction - stakes would be low. Given a change in the political will towards a more sympathetic attitude for social services, the stakes would be high in some specific areas, and moderate in relation to all civic policies proportional to government involvement.

The economic stakes (eg., wages, benefits, and employment conditions) of the civic union employee are accepted as being high.[20] Economic policies directly affecting the municipal union and non-economic policy were seen as having a significant relationship because of the possible consequences policy might have on the overall budget position of the city and several other aspects including changes to the composition of the workforce. In the Winnipeg case, the municipal union has actively participated in policy debates to argue against questionable management and costly patronage (eg., Harborview Golf Course, the case of Ritz Foods Ltd.). The concern is not simply wages and benefits. It includes addressing the

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[20] Zeigler, page 129 and Lineberry/Sharkansky [1978], page 106.

budgetary practices as a whole, and therefore, takes issue with a significant number of policy areas. Stakes in city policy, then, are high and there is validity in basing them on monetary considerations.

The School Board originated as a special purpose body within the city council mandate and was later constituted as its own level of government.[21] Since that time, the separation between the School Board and city council affairs has been complete to the point of having virtually no formal contact. The historical evolution of the city-Board relationship, then, has resulted in a situation within which stakes in city policies are low. The lack of Board-city exchanges did not preclude serious consequences resulting from policies in areas of urban development. Development policies were said to have already caused significant demographic changes which necessitated construction of new schools and closure of some established schools thus resulting in extra budget costs for the School Board. This aspect alone would imply high stakes for the School Board in the city's land use policies, yet it should also be noted that the city and the School Board share the same tax base. Because the quality of education may be significantly affected by budgetary problems and because city policy may significantly affect the budget, the School Board has a high stake in civic policy.

The stakes of the research group cannot be adequately understood on the basis of policy affect on the group's own position, but rather should be viewed as derivative of the area of interest which was taken as the subject of research. That is, research groups were said to have an

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[21] Higgins, page 106.

advocacy role, and therefore, a stake in policy. The relationship between policy and the group was indirect; the focus of researched reports was specific and touched upon few policy areas; and the bulk of group activity involved contract projects for clients. The lack of immediate or direct need to influence city policy is offset by the advocacy role, and so, some measure of stakes would correspond to research group involvement. Overall, the stake in city policy would be low to moderate.

The neighbourhood development group was substantially funded by the federal government and might, therefore, be seen to have a high stake in government policy in general. There was income from the tri-level fund (CAI) previously mentioned, yet only insignificant amounts came directly from the city government (under $3,000). The areas of concern regarding city policy involved minor problems such as locations of crosswalks, lane lighting, and so on, and major problems such as zoning regulations and building inspections, both of which could affect the group's building construction activities. The stakes in city policy were not insignificant, yet neither were they overbearing. In the traditional sense, neighbourhood associations that did not have an overt property tax concern would not have a legitimate stake even if protest were used. Stakes in the traditional sense, then, were not applicable. In the contemporary sense, stakes were moderate because activities required city cooperation in making zoning changes and addressing local problems.

The stake that the senior's group has in civic policy has increased in the recent past because of the significance of city funding mentioned

previously. The city's contribution (13.2% of group revenue), while significant, would not threaten group survival. The interview revealed seniors' involvement in city policy from time-to-time. For example, seniors organized protest demonstrations to save an historic fire hall from demolition, yet examples indicate that concerns are isolated and not a factor in the well-being of the group itself. The stakes of seniors, then, were moderate.

Finally, the business groups are traditionally viewed as having a high stake in city policy.[22] Government is a direct client for business enterprise; city government policy is often central to business strategy especially regarding developers and real estate interests, and property taxes are important to the operating cost of most enterprises. The benefits for business are significantly altered by policy. This same pattern is present in Winnipeg and need not be explored further. Business stakes in civic policy are high.

As examination of interest groups beyond the traditionally recognized interests (which tend to be restricted to business, unions, and ratepayers) shows quite divergent needs and goals. It would be inaccurate to make the conclusion that a group's stake in civic policy correlates to its lobby activity or its position relative to the hierarchy of council favour. Nor should it be assumed that, because groups might be silent on city policy they are also not interested. Frustrated attempts to influence policy and inadequate political resources with which to affect influence are inhibiting

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[22] Eulau, page 330 and Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 94 [1978].

factors. Criteria for assessment cannot be limited to monetary variables or other variables such as an interest in planning input because universal application across a representative sample of civic group actors is not possible. Research based on arbitrary universals that apply only half the time is easy and will indeed earn a just repute. Legitimacy cannot be adequately ascertained by falling back upon the profiles of those groups which have mustered strength enough to assert a civic presence and influence. Understanding group stakes requires attention to an understanding of unique group needs. Finally, the criteria of money as a determinant of stakes is, at best, inadequate, and, at worst, unjustifiably discriminatory.

The act of exercising influence because of the presence of significant stakes is dependent only partly on political will. Many groups are very willing to influence policy, yet their ability to do so is hampered by a formidable political reality for which the bottom line is the unsympathetic decision-maker. Stakes, then, can only partially explain the high level of motivation of some groups and not others. The gap between a group's ability to influence and actual policy output is displaced by the mold of elected personages——the decision makers or breakers.

(ii) Communication: Modes and Access

Within the range of communication modes, lobbying through presentations and solicitation of individual councillors was probably the most easily recognizable. Explanation is necessary for some other modes. The first three items in Table 2 regarding modes of communication mention linkages. The linkages in question include formalized channels of

communication between councillors, the administrators, and the interest groups, (eg., the collective agreement with unions, consultation with the Business Development Corporation, councillor's membership to a group's Board of Directors), yet linkages go beyond this to include informal and social linkages such as the coffee meeting or a game of golf both of which were cited as frequently used for purposes of input to civic affairs. The highest level of this type of intimate exchange was the friendly call to the mayor's office.

TABLE 2

THE HIERARACHY OF MODES OF COMMUNICATION

MODES OF COMMUNICATION / INTEREST GROUPS	Philanthropic Group	Municipal Unions	Business	Social Service Agencies	Political Parties	Winnipeg School Board	Research Institutes	Neighbourhood Development Corporations	Seniors
Social Linkages available/ Close ties with Mayor	Y	N	Y	N	LD	N	LD	N	LD
Innovated Board or Organizational Structures	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Network of Linkages Established	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Lobby with Presentations, Briefs	I	F	F	I	N	SM	F	SM	SM
Solicit Individual Councillors	I	SM	F	I	N	I	F	SM	SM
Resort to Protest Action	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y

*N = no
Y = yes
F = frequently
SM = sometimes
I = infrequently
LD = partially, or to a limited extent

The use of informal linkages cannot be underestimated in the Winnipeg case. One interviewee noted that an observer from another city might have

difficulty comprehending the method for creating policy because of the comparative lack of formal structures. It was further noted that most city business took place in the small coffee meeting of two or three people. The trust and confidence demanded by the intimacy of such a mode narrowed the access to a select body of individuals who conformed to the prevailing legitimacy. At the high end of the intimacy scale were the executives of the philanthropic group and the dominant business group.

Because the phone call to the mayor and coffee or golf with the relevant power broker emulate the most ideal environment for interest articulation, linkage techniques of a number of groups have been innovated to seek advantage using this model. The Boards of Directors of the dominant business group, the philanthropic group, and one of the research groups have been constituted to promote broad and in-depth linkage contact activity. The relevant term is networking. Essentially, Boards are large and, while retaining legitimacy through an elective process, individuals are selected by nominating committees on the basis of organizational and communication skills and the amount of power one is able to wield within the relevant spheres of influence.

The most sophisticated Board belonged to the dominant business group which had assigned one Board member to each of the 29 councillors and the mayor. The Board was 30 strong and each member was expected to maintain a close liaison with the councillor assigned. The high level of attention to civic affairs through Board design strongly correlated to the high stakes evident in the business interests. The Philanthropic group used a much larger leadership contingent consisting of 15 table officers and

committee chairpersons, 31 Board members, and more than 200 committee members. Unlike the business group, attention to community integration was the theme of Board design for the philanthropic group. The research group had innovated to reflect both the council-group focus of business and the community-group focus of the philanthropic organizaton, yet interviews indicated a lower sense of legitimacy, (ie., a social research thrust as distinct from business interest), relative to prevailing council attitudes and an access point correspondingly lower on the intimacy scale (eg., the direct call to the mayor was not available).

The practice of using large Boards selected for their powerful connections within the social structure worked to support interest group concerns at both the council level and very importantly at the power level below council. That is, excessively large committee structures are able to direct activities at multiple levels within specialized government departments and create community linkages between the elites of a multiple of institutional, group or community actors. Considerable elite based support may be wielded in this way.

In the case of the municipal workers' union, the Board or Executive Council was 300 strong, yet the members were elected to the Board as representatives of worker shops. It was emphasized in the interview that the board was designed to enhance the representative democratic ethic and was not designed with attention to efficacy in power relationships with the city. Council was cited as being rarely sympathetic to worker concerns, and so, the capacity to establish a network of intimate linkages at that level was futile. Some committee work was in place in an effort

to link with various points within the city government administration, yet the same sentiments of disapproval of union concerns expressed by councillors was evident (from interviews) among civic administrators. The problem of legitimacy had caused the union to shift its patterns of policy influence towards reliance upon the formal structures of negotiating contracts. Interviews with civic labour relations officers, as well as union leaders, revealed a keen appreciation for cooperation within the adversarial environment of labour-management relations. Adversity, however, does not contribute to intimacy.

More formal modes of communication took the form of traditionally popular lobby activity. That is, groups presented briefs to council, solicited the support of individual councillors, rallied public support, formed group liaisons to increase overall group clout, and resorted to avenues of political power open to them. The most frequent users of lobby techniques were the two groups with high stakes, ie., the civic union and business, and the social research group.

Formality was the most notable distinction separating the linkage mode from lobby activity. Formal modes of interest articulation were open to all participants willing to put in the effort necessary to present their interest. Formality and public access were strongly correlated. It should be understood that formal input to policy making decisions placed information about group concerns, about opposing concerns, and about public-at-large concerns before councillors. Whereas the coffee meeting used dialogue to work out problems, formality reduces opportunities to shape relationships between the city and interest areas and reduces

decisions to simple acceptance or rejection outcomes. Those groups, ie., unions, social need groups, the school board, and the neighbourhood development corporation, to whom intimacy of access was relatively unavailable could not expect automatically favourable responses or, where favourable responses were forthcoming, complete and acceptable responses. No matter how high stakes were, policy outcomes would be less satisfactory than policy outcomes for groups having access through intimate contact, at least because dialogue was diminished and, at most because adversity created council resistance.

The remaining mode of communication was protest. In one theoretical analysis, protest is seen as a consequence of overtly hostile actions on the part of a group whose interest is considered illegitimate. In another analysis, protest is the last resort of a group whose concerns have been subject to the unresponsiveness of decision-makers and yet are sufficiently important to prompt such drastic measures.

The use of protest was evident with unions, one social need group, and seniors. Alienation from civic affairs was most evident in the responses of the social need group. There were no established channels for dialogue about group concerns and little on-going involvement using formal methods. The frequency of contact with the city government was low and contributed to a general sense of illegitimacy of interests. The group in question served a constituency base of some of the lowest socio-economic groups in Winnipeg. Further, the subliminal, if not overt, political-ideological perspective of the group favoured citizen involvement of a non-elite lower class as opposed to the perspective of

council which was basically rightist upper-middle class. That is, ideological conflict complicated the group-civic relationship.

City employees in the United States are recognized as a powerful interest group in urban politics because they have important stakes in policy outcomes. Their livelihoods are determined by city policies. Also, they possess important resources. These recourses stem primarily from the collective bargaining process. Municipal employees could be a potent electoral block, and elected officials seem to be sensitive to their potential influence on civic elections. Unlike business corporations municipalities are non profit corporations that negotiate wage settlements with their employees without much constraint of balancing budgets. In recent years, however, as more cities have experienced fiscal problems, elected officials have adopted fiscal austerity measures and have taken a tougher stand on wage settlements with employees.

In the case of the municipal employee union in Winnipeg, the formal structure of collective bargaining was long established. The strike threat and the obvious inconvenience of such action necessitated a city stake in labour relations. Interviews indicated thoughtful use of protest actions including petitions, demonstrations at council meetings, and use of press releases with strategic considerations of stirring up public attention and support. The union would resort to such actions after normal channels of communication yielded only negative results, provided the issue was significant enough to generate protest action. While of occasional value to the union, protest was infrequent and insignificant relative to the volume of on-going communication. The significant protest event in the

past decade on the issue of contracting-out to the private sector, crystalized ideological polarity — hard-line right versus left. The use of protest action is unlikely in the absence of hardened and opposing stands taken by the city.

In the case of the Senior Citizen group, protest was not a consequence of polarity or illegitimacy. The incidents of protest concerned issues which may be seen as much more isolated from normal relationships than issues of contention regarding the union or the social need group. The one available example involved possible demolition of a neighbourhood firehall. For aesthetic and sentimental reasons, the will to save the building was sufficiently strong to create protest action in the face of seemingly resolute policy. Realistically, City Council response was indicative more of the halting speed of process than that of intent to overrule seniors' wishes. The City Council did not demolish. The event did not threaten group well-being in any way and was perceived by its participants as a friendly gesture of persuasion. Protest was the rare exception to the pattern of general favour on the part of council towards seniors.

In conclusion, the patterns of communication indicate three forums, namely informal linkages, formal representation, and protest. Access to the most intimate modes at the highest levels were restricted to the executives of the dominant business group and the philantrophic organization. Board designs attempted to facilitate intimate interactions over a wide range of power loci including councillors, the administrators, the private establishment, other groups, and so on. The formalized

structures of communication, ie., lobby activity, were open to the public, yet reduced opportunities for dialogue. Where protest arose, the elements of ideological polarity and perceived illegitimacy were usually present. Protest was not relevant to business interests, but was evident in the practice of unions, social need groups, and, to a lesser extent seniors. Analysis of the modes of communication show consistency with previous evidence and the literature; that is, business interests occupy a privileged position of power and other interests are not viewed as having similarly high levels of legitimacy.

Based on the evidence presented thus far, let us try to answer the questions raised earlier in this study. First, is the position of the business groups privileged and are other groups ignored by city council? Funding arrangements and communication linkages show that business occupies a position unavailable to other groups. Privilege in funding is extended to the elderly as well as business; and intimacy of communication is available to the philanthropic group as well as business. Business does not have exclusive privilege in the areas of funding and communication, yet the range of privilege is widest for business than any other group.

Measures of which groups are ignored by council is more difficult than determining which groups have favour because of the inherent inertia. If funding is used as the criteria, only business and the elderly were not ignored. The use of communications as a measurement criteria is complicated because groups may use public forums over which council has little means with which to prevent a group from being heard. On the basis

of the presence of communication through protest, unions and social need groups (seniors excepted) are subject to council disfavour. The emerging pattern which indicated a pro-business, pro-elderly and pro-charity (re: philanthropic group) attitude and an anti-labour, anti-social agency attitude is consistent with the findings of previous research.

Second, is there a positive correlation between a favourable group relationship with civic officials and intimate modes of communication? The two groups having access to intimate contact were the philanthropic group and the business group. While intimate contact in itself is indicative of a favourable relationship, a more substantive indicator is funding. In the case of the philanthrophic group explicit objectives attempted to avoid acceptance of government funding in order to preserve the private sector aspect. In the case of the business group, funding from city government was significant (salaries and expenses of nine professional employees), and so, intimacy and favour did correlate. The hypothesis is valid on the basis of the correlation of intimacy and funding once qualified for the exceptional case.

Third, is there a correlation between groups that use protest and city council disfavour? For unions and social need agencies this question has already been answered in the affirmative. In the case of the elderly, it must be recognized that while protest is evident, disfavour was not. The hypothesis is refuted on this basis. An analysis in greater depth is needed to explain more about the pattern of protest and disfavour.

On the part of unions and the social agency, protest is more indicative of a symptom of a normally latent conflict that has become

manifest. Seniors' protest springs not from any norm of conflict, rather it is a demonstration of civic duty where Council is reminded that not all of its decisions are correct. The hypothesis, then, needs to be modified to test the correlation between favour and the legitimacy of group interest. Protest has a partial role to play in explaining the relation between the city and urban groups, yet must be used in conjunction with other indicators such as legitimacy, conflict, and the presence of civic duty. Protest may be used to explain the city-group relationship in some cases.

Fourth, a further question was raised in regard to the frequency of the use of lobby activity.[23] Is there a correlation between freqeuncy of lobby activities and access to intimate communication? From Table 2 on modes of communication, one of the two groups to which intimate contact was available lobbied frequently (business) and the other lobbied only infrequently (philanthropic group). Of the three groups to which intimate contact with local government was available to a limited extent (seniors, research, and political parties), one group lobbied frequently, another infrequently, and a third lobbied sometimes. In reviewing the other end of the scale, ie., those groups where protest was used, a full range of frequency characteristic was in evidence. There was, then, no correlation between the frequency of use of the lobby forum and either access to intimate modes of communication or the resort to protest.

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[23] The indicators used refer to the frequency of making presentations and briefs to council on its committees and frequency of solicitation of individual councillors.

V. CASE STUDIES

A. Urban Research

As we have reviewed the more salient universal variables (funding, stakes, and communications) in the city-group relationship, we will now turn towards the salient uniquenesses concerning the city and individual groups.

To begin, the city government does not fund either research group, rather the city-research group relationship has involved the awarding of contracts. The city government views the two research groups as they would any other research consultant and has chosen not to extend preference. At best, the groups take the chance of winning in competitions by submitting the lowest bid. A second dimension to the relation involves the subject of research. Both groups have, at times, taken advocacy roles in issues of public concern which conflict with goals of the city. The prestige of professional research institutions and the strength of arguments has worked on occasion to embarass civic officials. It is not in the self-interest of civic officials, therefore, to lend support.

The role of the research groups has not been constant. At one time or another, roles have included: advocacy, contract work, coordination of public education, government consultant, social agency consultant, and involvement with an urban university program. The University affiliation and the emphasis on contract projects were innovations to group roles necessitated by the problems associated with funding. Survival of the institutions was precarious, and in one case, had reached critical

proportion. The need to innovate had its consequences on operations. In the group whose financial difficulties were acute at one critical stage, staff was pared to the minimum leaving only the Director and a part-time researcher. Output was reduced to specific contracts; survival rested on cultivation of the university program; and other roles were dropped. The consequences for the other group were more subtle and were linked to the funding relationship. For example, consultant work could be obtained for projects sponsored by social service agenices which were funded by provincial or federal government. That is, funding was indirectly available from government and the type of research was directly determined by the contracting agency. The bulk of direct funding originated with private philanthropic agencies whose ties with civic officials, tradition, and the ruling establishment were close, and therefore, influenced the bias of research activity. That is, detached roles were assumed in favour of actual group involvement in sensitive areas that might disturb the status quo and the topics of research were skewed away from controversial issues. The dominant factor determining the role of the research group was the funding source.

Whereas, funding had been available from both senior governments (CMHC in the federal case) and private contributing agencies, each individual source had its narrowed perspective which influenced the flow of money, and thereby, output. The city was not a participant, the reason for which may be partly linked to the research group's inherently critical role in the urban polity. The diversity of funding sources and the lack of any substantive commitment to urban research forces the research groups

to work in areas compatible with the conditions of funding. Unfortunately, this ad hoc scenario prevents coordination within or between the research groups. If the funding for urban research were channeled through a central board having representation of both groups in cooperation, the needs for urban research could be assessed and priorities could be determined. An element of diversity on such a board could serve to insulate urban research from the political wills of governments having ideologically opposing viewpoints. With sufficient attention to patterns of networking this same board could be effective in bringing the city government into the process.

The work of the independant research groups has had positive effect on civic life if not on civic officials' attitudes. Institutionalizing a more coordinated approach to funding could lead to better serving of research needs and greater involvement of the city government through joint funding schemes and through pressure on the city to expedite urban policy, planning and action.

B. Problems of Planning In Isolation: The School Board

A brief sketch of the School Boards' problem was presented in the discussion on stakes. It was noted that city development activities could seriously affect the School Board's budget in an undesirable way. Land use planning is a city responsibility. Where the city approves construction of residential neighbourhoods and housing projects, demands for schools follow. Land purchases and building construction costs for new schools as well as the accompanying on-going operational costs are factors which extend the board's financial resources. In Winnipeg where

growth is small and stable,[24] migration to new neighbourhoods causes reduction of the population of school age children in the established schools, and thereby precipitates the need to either close schools or maintain schools on an inefficient cost-benefit basis. A further problem arises from the transportation of children from neighbourhoods where schools have closed or neighbourhoods where there are school-age children in numbers too small to permit the feasible construction of a new school. The board, in these instances, must shoulder the responsibility of providing bus services. Public transit is an option that has been used where possible, yet in many new residential developments service is inadequate or there is a need to make several bus transfers. The board is often required to supply bus service of its own. Each of the above problems is costly to the tax payer and stems from inadequacies in planning rationale.

Since the time of the School Board's separation from the city, the city's role has been confined to that of tax collector. The decisions regarding the size of the Board levy remain with the Board, yet the fact that both the city and the Board share the identical property tax base is quite significant. The rising cost of maintaining public services and supplying new services is an accepted fact in our society and the burden rests with the taxpayer. The tax revenue potential from the property tax is finite. When the grumblings of discontented taxpayers is heard loudly enough, politicians will perceive the fulfillment of revenue potential and

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[24] The total population growth from 1976 to 1981 was 0.6% and from 1971 to 1981 0.46%. Figures from Canada Census data.

one could expect competition between the city and the Board for a larger share of a shrinking pie. The operating budget estimates for 1983 were $409,683,379 for the city and $183,991,422 for the School Board. The School Board share was 31%.

The cost of planning by the city government to the exclusion of the School Board might be avoided by establishing a better working relationship now. The almost absolute separation between the Board and the City is not conducive to cooperation and needs to be reassessed. Currently, the need to establish a School Board presence in the process of city development planning would help to alleviate the immediate problems related to demographic change. This relationship, if combined with a sincere political will to cooperate, should result in the best situation for both those receiving services and those paying for them.

VI. THE POLITICAL MILIEU

Thus far, it is clear that the current civic policy process lends favour to some and not others. The ultimate power of decision rests in the hands of civic councillors who have been documented as displaying significant homogeneity over a range of SES variables and who do not reflect the full range of characteristics present in the electorate. The pattern of their policy preferences in favour of business and against unions and social services is evident in the Winnipeg case. Political values of the right are unmistakable and have serious implications for the distribution of city government resources, the quality of society, and the well-being of interest groups. Reasons why this group has enjoyed consistent support and long-term dominance should be explored. We will turn to the electoral process for our answers. Three features of election patterns were salient to these questions: voting patterns, political party activity, and innovations to civic elections.

A. Political Participation And Upper-Class Bias

The Canadian civic polity has a long-term average voter turnout rate of 35% and, in the United States the turnout is 31%.[25] In the Canadian case, the same electorate will turnout at a rate of 66% to 75% in senior government elections.[26] Who participates?

Lineberry and Sharkansky (1978) indicate that ratepayers, because they pay taxes, have a high stake in civic affairs, and are, therefore,

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[25] Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 53 [1971].
[26] Higgins, page 246.

more likely to participate in elections.[27] Jerry Hough (1970) adds weight to this conclusion by outlining the historical eligibility of the electorate whose franchise was traditionally confined to property owners.[28] The immediate distinction in between those able to afford property and the non-owners who, in the past, were excluded from voting participation. Hough breaks down the socio-economic characteristics of the civic electorate by education, assessed house value, assessed value of rented premises, and occupation, and in each category participation was higher with higher affluence.[29] The "high-high" and "low-low" relationships between activism and status pertain.[30] Does the Winnipeg civic electorate display similar upper-class bias?

In assessing the Winnipeg case for SES comparisons and voter turnout, two city neighbourhoods were selected - Lord Roberts and Point Road.[31] Their geographical boundaries were sufficiently correspondent with census tract boundaries (CT002, CT503) after some adjustment was made for deviations in poll boundaries to be accurate for the purposes of this study. SES data, then, was taken from the 1981 census using education indicators, (ie., percentage of area residents having completed a university degree and percentage having reached grades (9-13), household

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27 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 94 [1978].
28 Hough, page 287.
29 Hough, page 288.
30 Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 93.
31 For the purposes of this study, reference will be made to the "Point Road" city neighbourhood. "Point Road" here includes Point Road, Wildwood, and Crescent Park (north of Dowker Avenuer) neighbourhoods.

income, and the occupant's estimated value of the residence. The average voter turnout was calculated using civic election results of those polls relevant to the census tract area.[32] The total eligible number of voters was not available from the poll data, yet a reasonable estimate was obtained by using the total number of persons of voting age as reported by the census data. Adjustment was made for ineligible voters. It was felt that because the adjusted figure for eligible voters for the city-as-a-whole was within 6.0% (1.7% difference between adjusted 1981 census data and 1983 reported number of eligible city voters and 5.3% for 1977 election and 1976 census data), the average turnout calculation was sufficiently accurate.[33] The calculations made for city-as-a-whole turnout using census data for eligible voters resulted in insignificant differences when compared to calculations using actually reported numbers of eligible voters. It would have been more suitable had poll data included total eligible voters, yet the alternative described above was felt to be sufficiently accurate.

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[32] The polls used in CT2 (Lord Roberts) included numbers 617, 618, 627 to 633, 640 to 646. the polls used in CT502 (Fort Garry) included numbers 33 to 44. Data were issued by the civic election authority.

[33] Normally, had data indicated the total number of eligible voters by poll, such data would be used and considered sufficiently accurate. Some question arises regarding the accuracy of total voters reported by enumerators because of missed persons or dwellings. As neither source (reported or Census data) is infallible, it was deemed that a difference under 10% was within tolerable limits.

TABLE 3

INDICATORS OF AFFLUENCE

SES Indicators	Winnipeg	(CT002) Lord Roberts	(CT503) Point Road
Education:			
# Holding a University Degree	9.6	7.0	24.7
# Having grade 9-13	42.1	42.1	31.6
Houshold Income	23208	19217	31879
Value of Dwelling	58866	39663	69033

Table 3 on SES indicators was compared to city data for the purposes of establishing the relative level of affluence. In the Lord Roberts neighbourhood, the percentage of people having a university degree was 7.0% or 2.6% below the city average, while the percentage having achieved grades 9 to 13 was the same as the city as a whole. Average household income was $4,000 lower than the city average and the average value of the occupied dwelling was $19,203 below the city average of $58,866. Lord Roberts, then, showed attributes of a neighbourhood of below average affluence: In the second neighbourhood, ie., Point Road, the percentage of persons holding a university degree was 24.7% or 15.1% above average. The total persons having achieved grades 9-13 was 31.6% or 10.5% below average. Household income was $31,879, as compared to the city average of $23,208, and the average dwelling value was $10,169 above

average. The Point Road neighbourhood was of significantly above average affluence.

TABLE 4

VOTER TURNOUT

Voter Turnout	Winnipeg	(CT002) Lord Roberts	(CT503) Point Road
Average Turnout 1977			
- Electoral Data	38.0*	42.0%	60.5%
- Census Data	39.6**		
Average Turnout 1980			
- Electoral Data	36.3	38.1	58.1
- Census Data	38.1		
Average Turnout 1983			
- Electoral Data	51.8	33.4	68.4
- Census Data	52.6		

**turnout is calculated using actual reported numbers of eligible voters
*turnout is calculated using adjusted census data to determine eligible number of voters

The voter turnout results of the two neighbourhoods show quite different patterns. The range of turnout for the neighbourhood of below average affluence was 33.4% to 42.0% which (with the exception of the 1983 election) was quite close to data for the city as a whole. In the significantly above average affluent neighbourhoods, turnout ranged from 58.1% to 68.4%. In the 1977 and 1980 elections, the turnout averaged 20.5% higher than the city averages of the same years. The high-high, low-low, relationship between affluence and participation reported by Patrick Moynihan (see, Lineberry and Sharkansky, 1978) was evident in the Winnipeg case.

B. Partisanship and Innovations in Civic Elections

Although one would expect that a political party would contribute substantially to increasing voter turnout, better awareness of issues, and to providing an outlet for policy interests, there is an acute lack of literature directed to the question of the raison d'etre of the local civic party in Canada. The question is answered partially in American sources: partisan elections lead to setting up constitutency offices and ward associations, more direct contact with officials, and greater frequency of contact;[34] the voter is better informed, costs of elections are reduced, party labels clarify policy directions, the party involves more participants, and issues are organized.[35]

Party activity at the local level in the past decade has led to their increasing relevance, and so, this area needs exploration. Higgins (1977) sketches two types of parties at the local level. First, he refers to the "civic party" which is specific to only one municipality, is rooted in the business reform era, attempts to keep "politics" out of civic affairs, professes not to be a political party, advocates administrative control through the city manager, is sometimes dominanted by business, is small in membership, yet powerful in controlling nominations for office, and is susceptible to internal divisions. There is a lack of explicit and unifying ideology and the group tends to be largely an election phenomenon that dissipates after voting day. Their usual slogan is "good, efficient, economical civic management."[36]

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[34] Banfield/Wilson, page 161.
[35] Lineberry/Sharkansky, page 85, 86 [1971].
[36] Higgins, page 227-230.

The second party type is that of the established national political party which has opted to enter the urban area. National party activity is rare, one reason for which has been a lack of interest on the part of the party itself.[37] What interest there is usually stems from the left, ie., CCF and NDP, although the Toronto Liberals made the effort in 1969. Higgins advocates that because of contemporary trends of urbanization, city reorganization, expanded city activities, and longer term decision making, major parties now have a higher stake in city government.[38] In Winnipeg, changes to the City of Winnipeg Act regarding amalgamation of surrounding municipalities included intent to set up a parliamentary form of government which would have necessitated party, yet the actual legislation excluded a council-elected mayor which thus emasculated party leadership. The lack of success which Higgins refers to in the case of Toronto, seems to have resulted in a temporary withdrawal. More recent events, however, include renewed activity of the left and NDP parties and some advances in Vancouver, Toronto, Hamilton, and Montreal as well as smaller centres.

The party in itself constitutes a significant innovation to urban government. Although Higgins indicates that party activity had little effect on voter turnout,[39] American literature supports the view that the non-partisan election reduced voter turnout in Democratic Party precincts, but has little affect on Republican precincts.[40] In this

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37 Higgins, page 237.
38 Higgins, page 237.
39 Higgins, page 240.
40 Banfield/Wilson, page 159.

same study, Banfield and Wilson infer that the non-partisan election favours those candidates of well-to-do status.[41] Lineberry and Sharkansky (1971) also observe that the non-partisan election attracts larger proportions of middle and upper class voters and smaller proportions of working class voters.

Very similar consequences result from the innovation of at-large elections. That is, turnout is reduced, upper class bias occurs, voter information is reduced, and candidates become more distant from the electorate. Winnipeg civic elections use the ward system, and not at-large elections, therefore, questions in this area cannot be explored. Questions concerning partisan activity, however, have increased in Winnipeg's October 1983 election.

The Winnipeg civic election of October 1983 was uncharacteristic of the usual civic election. The events leading up to voting day began with the unprecedented rally of NDP party activists at their municipal party convention in November of 1982. From this convention was derived a set of policies, the framework for election strategy, and a strong optimism towards the possibilities of electoral success. The NDP was the only established party to have openly and aggressively campaigned using the party label. The Conservative party was inactive in the election; the Liberal Party offered some support for candidates that carried the Liberal card. The recognizable "civic" party, the Independant Citizen's Election Committee (ICEC), which

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[41] Banfield/Wilson, page 160.

had been in control of city hall under one label or another since 1919,[42] became alarmed at the resolve of the NDP. Being fearful of being held up for their questionable record in a real election contest, the ICEC attempted to kill the element of partisanship in the civic election by announcing their dissolution on July 21st, 1983. The move effectively removed the opportunity to vote against the ICEC even though all the incumbent ICEC candidates ran in 1983.

Complementary to the party activation/deactivation were two rather highly popular referenda, one on nuclear disarmament and the other on the French language debate. The former was initially perceived as being a voter turnout stimulant in favour of the progressive civic forces of the left——the NDP; and the latter was undoubtedly a focal point upon which the anti-French sentiment could rally to express their rejection of what was perceived to be expansionism of Francophone cultural dominance being promoted by the provincial NDP. The issue was not a city matter, yet the right-wing, or more descriptively the reactionary, forces on Winnipeg Council and many of the rural councils which were also up for election, supported the plebiscite. A very good case could be made for simple pragmatic electoral manipulation directed at hurting the NDP (at the expense of the French in Manitoba and Canada). The outcome was no surprise——reaction was drawn to the polls and the citizens of Winnipeg voted 76.5% against the perceived pro-language rights position.

The complexity of influences that descended upon the 1983 civic election make analysis about party affect on voter turnout unreasonably

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[42] Rea Report 1976.

difficult. The French language plebiscite had very distinct consequences. In the Lord Roberts neighbourhood, which voted 63.9% for the provincial NDP in 1981 and was never below 50% pro-NDP support in the past three provincial contests and normally turned out at a rate of 40% in civic elections, dropped in turnout in the 1983 election by approximately 7%. Conversely, the Point Road neighbourhood which voted 65% plus in favour of the Conservatives in the past two provincial elections, turned out 68.4% in October of 1983 for an increase of approximately 9%. The drop in the turnout of NDP voters and the increase in the turnout of right-wing voters is not consistent with the expected outcome of increased party activity which should have been an increase in turnout for both camps.

Overall the voter turnout increased from an average 38-39% city-wide to 52.6% (as reported by the Chief Returning Officer). The language plebiscite was probably the most dominant direct factor in producing the increased turnout. The results are too obscured to adequately validate conclusions about the prospects of party activity in Winnipeg.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The dynamics of the organized interest groups in Winnipeg deserves further research and this exploratory study suggests that there was an ideological split between the right and the left. On the right, favour, as determined by funding and intimacy of communication went to the privileged, namely business, and to a lesser extent, the charitable, namely the philanthropic group and the elderly. On the left, there was no evidence of city funding of any consequence and no easy access to the power elite. Minority groups, the low income classes, community based social services agencies, the municipal employees and research groups were not recipients of civic favour according to the criteria of funding and communications. Outside of the ideology of right and left, (or so it is hoped), some institutions such as research groups and the school board might have a good case for a close relationship with the city, but such has not been the case.

The pattern of right-left politics at Winnipeg City Hall is further supported from an analysis of all groups receiving city money[43]. An interesting finding supporting the Right-wing ideological basis of civic decisions was an allocation of $15,000 Special Grants to the Progessive Conservative Party. No other political party was listed as recipient of city money.

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[43] Assessment of the City of Winnipeg's commitment to group funding is based on the "authorized" postions of "Special Grants" to December, 1983. A list of groups receiving more than $10,000 from the city is provided in Appendix (iii).

Of the traditionally elite-oriented cultural groups, the Art Gallery accounted for $1 out of $5 spent on special grants. The Art Gallery, Rainbow Stage, the Ballet, and Symphony accounted for 39.9% of all special grants. Such organizations as Osborne House (for battered women) and Klinic (a community health group) did not make it to the list of special grants recipients. The Native Alcoholism Council of Manitoba got $4,000, while the Men's Music Club received $13,3000.

Winnipeg is not a good example of an integrated, city community i.e. too many legitimate concerns are left out of the mainstream of civic policy affairs. There is evidence of social, community-oriented leadership from both senior levels of government, yet, in view of the directions taken by these other levels of governments, the city council's perception of the range of its legitimate responsibilities is narrow. There is not enough evidence to assert that the city has a concern for all of its constituent groups.

Favour, privilege, and charity, evident in city funding and communications, do not attend to the need for fairness. Being fair in Winnipeg will mean that councillors will have to rise above ideological bias and recognize the legitimate interests of more groups than those to which they themselves hold partisan sentiment.

More importantly, it is the electorate who should organize and influence urban policy. The research evidence confirms a state of

injustice similar to the Winnipeg case throughout North America and for the past 100 years at least. Our democracy has come out of the age of privileged voter eligibility based on property wealth, but relationships reflected in policy approaches remain very much the same.

Patterns of voter participation evident in the results of civic elections show that city government is elected by a numerical minority of eligible voters. That minority is skewed to the upper class. Unfortunately, the imbalance in the electorate produces a similar imbalance in representation at the city council, and thereby the disadvantaged groups and their interests are not normally part of the urban decision-making system. This situation calls for a re-examination of the civic electoral process.

It should be noted that the interest group system though useful in some ways is not always representative of the public at large. Some people with adequate resources are more likely to get together and organize than others. Some interests tend to be omitted from the urban policy process because the groups representing them are often not well organized, or because they lack resources. For example, the poor or minority groups are less likely to organize. If they are organized they may suffer from lack of resources. Consequently, they are less likely to be represented in the urban policy process. The interest group system is biased toward those who do organize and possess sufficient resources and legitimacy.

Democratic political structure is based on the freedom to organize. If politicians have no desire to respond to a wide spectrum of interest groups then that freedom is extremely restricted. Elected officials —- mayors,

councillors —- should not pay attention to a few interest groups alone neglecting a large number of interests, if urban democracy is to have meaning and representation of all sectors of the community.

Appendix (i)

University of Winnipeg

URBAN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Background Information

1. a) Name of Organization

   b) Adress:

   c) Phone:

2. Purpose/Goals:

3. Functions/Services:

4. Constituency:

   Social Base: Who does the group represent? Whose interests does it serve.

Class | Age

Ethnic Group | Locale

Sex | Subculture/Life Style

Geographic concentration vs. dispersion

5. Size:

Formal membership?

How many members do you have?

Volunteers?

Staff?

6. Formal Structure:

a) Board of Directors Composition:

Number | Class

Ethnicity | Age

Sex

b) How selected: a) Nomination
b) Election
c) Appointment

Duration:

Responsibilities:

c) Forms of Out Reach:
   a) Newsletter
   b) Open Meetings
   c) Media
   d) Other

d) Sources of support:
   a) Government
   b) Non-governmental
   c) Public
   d) Financial
   e) Technical
   f) Ideological

7. Community Context:

a) How well is the organization known in the community?

b) What segment of the community does it represent?

c) Current Issues

d) Is it involved (directly or indirectly) in civic elections, urban policy, or service delivery?

e) How, in what way?

f) As an urban organization is it concerned with urban development, planning, policy, service delivery, etc.?

8. General Comments/Suggestions/Expectations - Issues, etc. re: urban policy and services:

9. Organization's Spokesperson:

Date:

Appendix (ii)

FISCAL AUSTERITY AND URBAN INNOVATIONS

INFORMATION FROM CITY MAYORS

PART 1. FISCAL POLICIES

Q1 In the last three years how important was the professional staff as compared to elected officials in affecting the overall spending level of you city government? (Circle one number)

1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY SET LEVEL
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF SUGGEST APPROXIMATE LEVEL
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS INCLUDING MAYOR HAVE ABOUT EQUAL INPUT IN SETTING LEVEL
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS SET APPROXIMATE LEVEL
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY SET LEVEL
6 FEW ANNUAL CHANGES, PAST PATTERNS USUALLY FOLLOWED INCREMENTALLY
7 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q2 How about in allocating funds among departments? (Circle one number)

1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY SET ALLOCATIONS
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF SET APPROXIMATE ALLOCATIONS
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS HAVE ABOUT EQUAL INPUT IN SETTING LEVEL
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS SET APPROXIMATE ALLOCATIONS
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY SET ALLOCATIONS
6 FEW ANNUAL CHANGES, PAST PATTERNS USUALLY FOLLOWED INCREMENTALLY
7 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q3 How about in developing new fiscal management strategies, such as imposing user charges for swimming or contracting out for services like garbage collection? (Circle one number)

1 PROFESSIONAL STAFF LARGELY DECIDE
2 PROFESSIONAL STAFF OFTEN DECIDE
3 PROFESSIONAL STAFF AND ELECTED OFFICIALS HAVE ABOUT EQUAL INPUT IN DEVELOPING NEW STRATEGIES
4 ELECTED OFFICIALS OFTEN DECIDE
5 ELECTED OFFICIALS LARGELY DECIDE
6 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q4 Please indicate your own preferences about spending. Circle one of the six answers for each of the 13 policy areas.

1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city
2 Spend somewhat less
3 Spend the same as is now spent
4 Spend somewhat more
5 Spend a lot more
DK Don't know/not applicable

POLICY AREAS

1.	ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2.	PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3.	SOCIAL WELFARE	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4.	STREETS AND PARKING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5.	MASS TRANSPORTATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6.	PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7.	PARKS AND RECREATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8.	LOW-INCOME HOUSING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9.	POLICE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10.	FIRE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11.	CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, SEWERS, ETC.)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12.	NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13.	SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

Q5 Please estimate the preference of the majority of voters in your city. Again, circle one of the six answers for each policy area.

1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city
2 Spend somewhat less
3 Spend the same as is now spent
4 Spend somewhat more
5 Spend a lot more
DK Don't know/not applicable

Policy Areas

1.	ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2.	PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3.	SOCIAL WELFARE	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4.	STREETS AND PARKING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5.	MASS TRANSPORTATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6.	PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7.	PARKS AND RECREATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8.	LOW-INCOME HOUSING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9.	POLICE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10.	FIRE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11.	CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, SEWERS, ETC.)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12.	NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13.	SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

Q6 Please indicate how successful you have been in implementing your own spending preferences in this term of office. Circle one of the six answers for each policy area.

1 Very successful
2 Somewhat successful
3 Somewhat unsuccessful
4 Very unsuccessful
5 The policy is not in the jurisdiction of the city government
DK Don't know/not applicable

Policy Areas

1.	ALL AREAS OF CITY GOVERNMENT	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2.	PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3.	SOCIAL WELFARE	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4.	STREETS AND PARKING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5.	MASS TRANSPORTATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6.	PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOSPITALS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7.	PARKS AND RECREATION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8.	LOW-INCOME HOUSING	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9.	POLICE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10.	FIRE PROTECTION	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11.	CAPITAL STOCK (e.g. ROADS, SEWERS, ETC.)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12.	NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13.	SALARIES OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

PART II. PARTICIPANTS

Q7 Please indicate your judgment about the spending preferences of several participants in city government affairs. Circle one of the six answers for each of the types of participants. Does the participant want to

1 Spend a lot less on services provided by the city
2 Spend somewhat less
3 Spend the same as is now spent
4 Spend somewhat more
5 Spend a lot more
DK Don't know/not applicable

Participants

1 PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS AND FAMILIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3 HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4 NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5 CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF WOMEN)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6 ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7 TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8 BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS-ORIENTED GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9 THE ELDERLY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10 LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11 CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12 INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13 CONSERVATIVE PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
14 LIBERAL PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
15 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
16 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
17 MAYOR	1	2	3	4	5	DK
18 CITY COUNCIL	1	2	3	4	5	DK
19 CITY MANAGER OR CAO	1	2	3	4	5	DK
20 CITY FINANCE STAFF	1	2	3	4	5	DK
21 DEPARTMENT HEADS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
22 FEDERAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
23 PROVINCIAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

Q8 Please indicate how active the participant has been in pursuing this spending preference. Circle one of the six answers for each of the types of participants. Has the participant carried on

1 No activity
2 Little activity
3 Some activity
4 A lot of activity
5 The most activity of any participant
DK Don't know/not applicable

Participants

1	PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2	ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS AND FAMILIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3	HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4	NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5	CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF WOMEN)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6	ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7	TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8	BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS-ORIENTED GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9	THE ELDERLY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10	LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11	CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12	INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
14	LIBERAL PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
15	NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
16	OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
17	MAYOR	1	2	3	4	5	DK
18	CITY COUNCIL	1	2	3	4	5	DK
19	CITY MANAGER OR CAO	1	2	3	4	5	DK
20	CITY FINANCE STAFF	1	2	3	4	5	DK
21	DEPARTMENT HEADS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
22	FEDERAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
23	PROVINCIAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

Q9 Please indicate how often the city government responded favorably to the spending preference of the participant in the last three years. Circle one of the six answers for each of the types of participants. The city has responded favorably.

1 Almost never
2 Less than half the time
3 About half the time
4 More than half the time
5 Almost all the time
DK Don't know/not applicable

Participants

1	PUBLIC EMPLOYERS AND THEIR UNIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
2	ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH LOW INCOME GROUPS AND FAMILIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
3	HOMEOWNERS GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
4	NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
5	CIVIC GROUPS (E.G. ACTION CTTME. ON STATUS OF WOMEN)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
6	ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED WITH MINORITY GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
7	TAXPAYERS ASSOCIATIONS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
8	BUSINESSMEN AND BUSINESS-ORIENTED GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS (E.G. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
9	THE ELDERLY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
10	LOCAL MEDIA (RADIO, TV, PRESS)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
11	CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
12	INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
13	CONSERVATIVE PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
14	LIBERAL PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
15	NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY	1	2	3	4	5	DK
16	OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY PARTY)	1	2	3	4	5	DK
17	MAYOR	1	2	3	4	5	DK
18	CITY COUNCIL	1	2	3	4	5	DK
19	CITY MANAGER OR CAO	1	2	3	4	5	DK
20	CITY FINANCE STAFF	1	2	3	4	5	DK
21	DEPARTMENT HEADS	1	2	3	4	5	DK
22	FEDERAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK
23	PROVINCIAL AGENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	DK

Q10 The types of participants listed above are frequently active in city government affairs. Could you list the 5 types of participants which are most influential in decisions affecting city fiscal matters in the past three years? (Feel free to mention participants not on the above list.)

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

4 _____

5 _____

Q11 What are the five most influential participants in city government in general (not just in fiscal matters)?

_____ A. Same five as in Q10.

_____ B. If any are different from Q10, please list all five.

1 _____

2 _____

3 _____

4 _____

5 _____

PART III. VIEW ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES

These are some widely used survey questions. We plan to use them to compare (1) cities with each other, and (2) city leaders with national samples of citizens.

Q12 If your city government were given an increase in General Transfer Payment equal to 20 percent of total local expenditures, how would you like to see the funds used? (Circle one number)

1 REDUCE PROPERTY TAXES AND OTHER LOCAL TAXES
2 INCREASE ALL SERVICES EQUALLY
3 INCREASE BASIC SERVICES (LIKE POLICE AND FIRE)
4 INCREASE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
5 INCREASE SOCIAL SERVICES
6 OTHER _____
_____

Q13 "Federal income taxes should be cut by at least one third even if it means reducing military spending and cutting down on government services such as health and education." What is your feeling? (Circle one number)

1 AGREE
2 DISAGREE
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q14 Should city council members vote mainly to do what is best for their district or ward or to do what is best for the city as a whole even if it doesn't really help their own district? What is your feeling? (Circle one number)

1 DISTRICT
2 CITY AS WHOLE
3 DON'T KNOW

Q15 How important is the religious, ethnic, or national background of candidates in slating and campaigns for your city council? (Circle one number)

1 VERY IMPORTANT AND EXPLICITY DISCUSSED IN SLATING AND CAMPAIGNS
2 FAIRLY IMPORTANT
3 OCCASIONALLY IMPORTANT
4 SELDOM IMPORTANT
5 VIRTUALLY NEVER EXPLICITY DISCUSSED
6 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q16 Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? (Circle one number)

1 FAVOR
2 OPPOSE
3 DON'T KNOW

Q17 In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of school children from one school to another and merger/closure of schools when enrolments decline? (Circle one number)

1 AGREE
2 DISAGREE
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q18 "If a political leader helped people who need it, it doesn't matter that some of the rules are broken." What is your feeling? (Circle one number)

1 AGREE
2 DISAGREE
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q19 Would you be for or against sex education in public schools? (Circle one number)

1 FOR
2 AGAINST
3 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q20 Do you think abortion should be legal under any circumstances, legal only under certain circumstances, or never legal under any circumstances? (Circle one number)

1 UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES
2 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
3 NEVER LEGAL
4 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q21 Prime Minister Trudeau has urged all levels of government to follow voluntary wage restraint (six and five percent guidlines) program to hold down spending and taxes. The Conservative and New Democratic Parties, on the other hand, say that the Federal government should allocate more money for job creation to reduce unemployment. Which position do you agree with more - holding down spending and taxes or spending more money for job creation programs? (Circle one number)

1 HOLDING DOWN SPENDING
2 MORE JOB CREATION PROGRAMS
3 UNDECIDED

PART IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Finally, a few background questions about yourself for statistical pruposes.

Q22 How many terms have you served a mayor? (Circle one number)

1 ONE (This is my first term)
2 TWO
3 THREE
4 MORE THAN THREE

Q23 Approximately how many years have you spent in <u>elected</u> office?

_____ (YEARS)

Q24 Although many cities have non-partisan elections, parties still are sometimes important. What political party, if any, do you identify with? (Circle one number)

1 CONSERVATIVE PARTY
2 LIBERAL PARTY
3 NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY
4 OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____

Q25 How often did you mention this party affiliation in your last campaign? (Circle one number)

1 ALMOST ALWAYS
2 FREQUENTLY
3 SELDOM
4 ALMOST NEVER
5 NEVER

Q26 How active was your party in your last election? (Circle one number)

1 PARTY HELPED SELECT AND ENDORSE ME AND WAS ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN
2 PARTY ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN
3 PARTY OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATED
4 PARTY NOT ACTIVE IN CAMPAIGN

Q27 Approximately how often do you meet with local party officials? (Circle one number)

1 SEVERAL TIMES A MONTH
2 ONCE A MONTH
3 SEVERAL TIMES A YEAR
4 SELDOM
5 NEVER

Q28 How often did you use the local media (radio, TV, the press) in the last two months of your last campaign? (Please include both paid advertisements and other media coverage) (Cirlce one number)

1 NAME APPEARED IN THE MEDIA SEVERAL TIMES A DAY
2 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A DAY
3 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A WEEK
4 NAME APPEARED LESS THAN ONCE A WEEK
5 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q29 Excluding election periods, how often have you appeared in the local media in the past two years? (Circle one number)

1 NAME APPEARED IN THE MEDIA SEVERAL TIMES A DAY
2 NAME APPEARED ABOUT ONCE A DAY
3 NAME APPEARED A FEW TIMES A WEEK
4 NAME APPEARED LESS THAN ONCE A WEEK
5 DON'T KNOW/NOT APPLICABLE

Q30 Sometimes elected officials believe that they should take policy positions which are unpopular with the majority of their constituents. About how often would you estimate that you took a position against the dominant opinion of your constituents? (Cirle one number)

1 NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER
2 ONLY RARELY
3 ABOUT ONCE A MONTH
4 MORE THAN ONCE A MONTH
5 REGULARLY

Q31 How do you feel about the total local tax burden (from city, country, school district, and special district governments)? (Circle one number)

1 SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED
2 SHOULD BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT
3 ABOUT RIGHT
4 SHOULD BE INCREASED SOMEWHAT
5 SHOULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY
6 DON'T KNOW

Q32 Please indicate your present age.

_____ (YEARS)

Q33 Which of the following best describes your ethnic or racial identification? (Circle one number)

1 WHITE (ANGLOPHONE)
2 WHITE (FRANCOPHONE)
3 WHITE (OTHER THAN ABOVE, PLEASE SPECIFY)
4 NON WHITE (PLEASE SPECIFY) _____

Q34 Are you (Circle one number)

1 MALE
2 FEMALE

Q35 Is your religious background? (Circle one number)

1 PROTESTANT
2 CATHOLIC
3 JEWISH
4 OTHER

Q36 What is the highest grade or year in elementary school, high school, or college you have completed? (Circle one number)

NONE.....1
ELEMENTARY 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
HIGH SCHOOL.....09 10 11 12
COLLEGE.....13 14 15 16
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL.....17
GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL 18

Q37 Name of person completing this questionnaire _____

Address _____

Telephone ( ) _____

Is there anything else that you would like to tell us concerning Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation--any particular lessons from your city, solutions you may have found, or problems that remain that you would like to bring to the attention of others? Comments here or in a separate letter would be welcome.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP - WE HOPE THE RESULTS CAN HELP YOUR CITY

Appendix (iii)

Organized Interest Groups receiving $10,000+ from City of Winnipeg (As Authorized up to December 1983)

1.	Winnipeg Art Gallery	280,880
2.	Age and Opportunity Centre	104,000
3.	Winnipeg Convention and Visitors Bureau	100,450
4.	Rainbow Stage Inc.	99,000
5.	Royal Winnipeg Ballet	99,000
6.	Winnipeg Symphony Orchestra	99,000
7.	Main Street Project Inc.	58,992
8.	Arc Industries Inc.	47,500
9.	Salvation Army	41,100
10.	Community Folk Arts Council of Winnipeg Inc.	32,000
11.	Canadian National Institute for the Blind	30,000
12.	Faculty of Physical Educ. and Recreation Studies	30,000
13.	Winnipeg Humane Society (one-time grant)	30,000
14.	Lions Club of Winnipeg (one-time grant)	30,000
15.	Canadian Association for the Mentally Retarded	26,000
16.	Kinsmen Reh-Fit Centre (one-time grant)	23,986
17.	Planned Parenthood Winnipeg Inc.	18,600
18.	Midwestern Rail Assn. (1975) Inc. (one-time grant)	17,369
19.	P. C. Party of Canada (Manitoba Association)	15,000
20.	Scandinavian Centre	15,000
21.	Ukrainian Cultural and Educational Centre	14,011
22.	Men's Music Club	13,000
23.	Manitoba Opera Association	11,300
24.	Contemporary Dancers	11,000
25.	Citizenship Council of Manitoba	10,300
	total	1,258,488
	total of all Special Grants	1,448,723

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